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York rule when inter vivos disposition is restricted. Although in the
Michel case the contract was binding prior to death and the stock was
held to have passed under the will, the court stressed that this was
because of the fact situation there, the optionee being also made legatee
of the shares. Regardless of the merits of this decision when considered
in the light of the Wilson case 21 it seems safe to predict that at least
where that peculiar fact situation does not exist, the court would prob-
ably adopt the New York or so-called "Federal Rule."
Thus until further decisions clarify the present situation, it would
seem most advisable for the attorney in drafting one of these agree-
ments to fix its provisions with an eye to making the price set acceptable
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and probably the Wisconsin
Tax Department will follow suit unless the option holder is bequeathed
the shares.
JOHN M. GROGAN
Damages-Measure of Damages for Anticipatory Repudiation
and Seller's Duty to Mitigate-By virtue of a binding contract the
plaintiff was to sell 500 tons of scrap steel to the defendant, delivery
to be made as specified in the contract. Prior to the time fixed for
performance the defendant cancelled its order for the purchase, pre-
sumably because the market for scrap steel was rapidly descending. The
plaintiff did not accept the repudiation as a breach of the contract and
subsequently requested the defendant to accept the scrap steel. At the
time of trial, about a year after the repudiation, the market value of
the steel was $6.00 per ton higher than the agreed purchase price.
Since the seller had retained the steel the defendant contended (1) that
the plaintiff had not been injured by the breach and therefore was not
entitled to any damages, and (2) the plaintiff had not discharged his
duty to mitigate damages as he had not sold the steel on the rapidly
descending market within a reasonable time after the repudiation.
Held: The measure of damages is the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the date of the breach of the contract
minus any savings derived by the plaintiff due to the defendant's breach,
such as transportation costs. Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B.
Beaird Co., Inc., 63 So. 2d 144 (La. 1953).
The issue presented is: what is the measure of damages, and what
is the seller's duty to mitigate, if any, in the case of an anticipatory
repudiation that is not accepted by the seller when the market value
of the goods is higher than the contract price at the time of trial?
The dissenting opinions in the instant case held that the plaintiff-
vendor had a duty to resell the steel as a condition precedent to an action
2 1 Supra, note 8.
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for damages, and also, that the plaintiff should not recover damages as
the market value of the steel at the time of trial was higher than the
contract price, and therefore the plaintiff had not incurred any loss.
This latter statement was erroneously deduced from the salutary premise
that the primary aim of the law of damages for a breach of a contract
is to place the plaintiff in the same position he would have been in if
the contract had been fulfilled.
The general rule for the measure of damages in the-case of an
anticipatory repudiation of a contract to sell goods, other than
"futures"' is the difference between the contract price and the lower
market price at the time fixed for performance by the contract,2 and not
the market value at the time of the repudiation,3 as was used by both
the majority and minority in the instant case.4 The Uniform Sales Act
provides that where there is an available market, and in the absence of
special circumstances showing approximate damages of a greater
amount, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract
price and the market price at the time for performance.5 The application
of the rule introduces an element of uncertainty and speculation in
assessing damages when the case is tried before the time set for per-
formance. In such a case the cy pres doctrine is applied,6 and damages
are assessed "as near as" possible.7 No authority was found by this
writer that computes the measure of damages on the basis of the market
value at the time of the trial as was suggested by the minority. If such
was used as the criterion, the rights of the parties would depend on
conditions arising at an uncertain and future date. In fact, it would
leave the rights of the parties uncertain and encourage litigants to jockey
for a trial on a date when the market was favorable.
Where the vendor does not accept the repudiation as a breach of the
contract the general rule is that the vendor need not resell the property
'The market value at the time of repudiation is used to determine the
damages "in contracts for future performance-such as contracts to sell wheat
or cotton or hops in the future, or to insure-where the contract itself canbe said to have a market value." WILLISTON, SALES §587 (rev. ed. 1948);
Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1899); 38 MICH. L. REv. 94 (1939).
2 Roehm v. Horst, supra, note 1; United Press Ass'n v. National Newspaper
Ass'n, 237 Fed. 547 (1916); Lagerloef Trading Co., Inc. v. American Paper
Products Co., 291 Fed. 947 (1923); WILLISTON, SALES §587 (rev. ed. 1948);
SEDGWICKc, DAMAGES §636(d) (9th ed. 1912); 10 CORNELL L. Q. 135, 168
(1925).
3 SEGwicK, DAMAGES, supra, note 2.
4 As a matter of stare decisis it appears that Louisiana is committed to the rule
that the market value of the goods is determined as of the date of the breach.
Interstate Electric Company, 173 La. 103, 136 So. 283 (1931). It should be
observed, however, that most authorities hold that in the case of an antici-
patory repudiation that is not accepted by the promisee the date of breach is
actually the date set for performance, infra, notes 13, 16 and 17, and is not
the date of the repudiation.
5 UNIFORM SALES ACT sec. 64(3) ; Wis. Stats. (1951), sec. 121.64(3).
6 24 COL. L. REv. 55 (1924).
744 A.L.R. 246 (1926).
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prior to the time set for performance." The correctness of this rule can
be sustained on the basis of various legal theories: (1) That since the
ordinary rule of damages in anticipatory repudiation cases9 "is generally
supposed to fix a minimum of damages,"'1 and since "it is presumed
that at the inception of an agreement the parties mutually contemplated
that, in case of... (a breach, the promisee) ... will be damnified to
the extent of the difference between the contract price and the fair
market value of the subject of the transaction at the time and place for
such delivery,"" it would seem that the promisor should have no cause
to complain that the plaintiff had not resold the goods prior to the time
fixed for performance, providing the plaintiff does not seek damages in
excess of the minimum; (2) That the rule requiring mitigation only
applies to consequential damages and never to direct damages; that
"direct damage is impossible to avoid; and the rule which forbids the
recovery of compensation for avoidable consequences of an injury does
not cover the direct loss in any way;"1 and that the loss of profit on a
contract is a direct loss; (3) That the rejection of the repudiation in-
volves a continuance of the obligations on both sides of the contract ;13
that while the contract is "subsisting and unbroken," the parties can
only be compelled to do that which its terms require ;14 therefore there
is no duty upon the vendor to resell prior to the date set for perform-
ance as such a duty would be inconsistent with the idea that the contract
continues unbroken ;15 (4) That the repudiation is a mere "prophecy"
that the repudiator will breach the contract, or a mere threat of wrong,
and it may be disregarded ;1B that a repudiation, itself, does not consti-
tute a breach; that no one is obliged to mitigate upon a mere threat of
wrong; it is only after a cause of action has arisen that a party is called
upon to mitigate damages. 17 It should be noted that under this last
theory that there is no duty to mitigate even as to consequential
damages.'
In conclusion, on the mitigation issue, the majority in the instant
case is supported by the weight of authority as well as what appears
to be the better reasoned view. In assessing damages, however, the
court, apparently because of the doctrine of stare decisis, stated the
8 WILSTON, SALES §588 (rev. ed. 1948); 10 CORNELL L. Q. 135, 176 (1925);
38 MICH. L. REv. 94 (1939).
9 Supra, note 2.
20 Foss v. Heineman, 144 Wis. 146, 128 N.W. 881 (1910).
11 Ibid.
22 Beale, Damages Upon Repudiation of a Contract, 17 YALE L. J. -443, 456(1908).
13 Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7 Ex. 111 (1872).
14 Ibid; Kadish et al. v. Young et al., 108 Ill. 170, 48 Am. Rep. 548 (1883).
15 Kadish et al. v. Young et al., supra, note 14.
16 Ibid; Frost v. Knight, supra, note 13; P. P. Emory Mfg. Co. v. Saloman,
178 Mass. 582, 60 N. E. 377 (1901).
'7 P. P. Emory Mfg. Co. v. Saloman, supra, note 16.
Is Supra, note 12.
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general minority rule of contracts that the market value is to be deter-
mined as of the date of the breach, but then the court assumed that the
contract was breached as of the date of the repudiation. Even under
that minority rule, if the court had given recognition to the rule of the
Frost v. Knight case"" the result would have been to determine the
market value as of the date fiked for performance, because, under that
case, if the repudiation is not accepted the contract is not breached until
the time set for performance.
FINTAN M. FLANAGAN
Aliens-Validity of Marriage for Immigration Purposes-De-
fendants participated in civil marriage ceremonies with three refugees
in Paris, France, for the sole purpose of enabling these refugees to
enter the United States as spouses of honorably discharged American
veterans under the War Brides Act.1 The refugees were subsequently
admitted into the United States as such spouses, although the marriages
were never consummated and the parties in two of the cases involved
have never cohabited as husband and wife. Defendants were convicted
of a conspiracy to defraud the United States by the making of false
statements or concealing material facts from the immigration authori-
ties.2 Held: Affirmed. No evidence of French law having been pre-
sented at the trial, it will be presumed that French law on the point is
the same as American law. Under American law these marriages would
not be valid. Furthermore, the validity of these marriages as such is not
in issue here, as the marriages were but one step in the defendants'
scheme to defraud the United States. The question whether the mar-
riages might be valid for other purposes is of no importance. Lutwak
et al. v. United States, 344 U.S. 809 (1953), petition for rehearing
denied 73 S.Ct, 726.
The status of marriage has for many years occupied a position of
some importance under our imigration legislation. Under the Immigra-
tion Act of 1917,3 which, despite several amendments is still the basic
immigration law of this country,4 preferential treatment is accorded to
spouses of citizens or legal residents of the United States. This policy
is preserved in the Immigration Act of 1924,1 and the recent Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarran Act.6 In many
19 Supra, notes 13 and 4.
159 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U.S.C. §232. The minority opinion expressly states,
and the majority opinion appears to concede, that the marriages in question
were ceremonially valid, at least in the sense that some judicial proceedings
would be necessary if the parties wished to be relieved of their marital
obligations. 71 L.Ed. 364 (1953).
2 Under 43 STAT. 153, 8 U.S.C. §220(c) (1946 ed.).
3 39 STAT. 874 (1917).
4 KANsAs, U.S. IMmiGRATION Exc.usioN Am DEPorrATiON 103 (3rd ed. 1948).
5 Sec. 4; 43 STAT. 153, 8 U.S.C. §220 (1946 ed.).
68 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. In particular, see 205(b).
1953]
